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Since its enactment in 2006, effective January 1, 2007, the Ohio Trust Code
(“OTC”) has been amended, a number of cases have been decided under it, and a variety
of issues related to or raised by it have been identified. This article will review those
developments.

I.

Amendment

The OTC’s first amendments were made by House Bill 499, which was enacted in
June of 2008 and took effect September 12, 2008. While most of them are technical or
clarifying in nature, several are substantive. The following brief discussion of some of the
more important amendments is presented in the order of the sections of the OTC that they
affect.1
Governing law.2 The original OTC’s governing law provision, R.C. §5801.06,
addressed what law applies to determine “the meaning and effect of the terms” of the
trust. It did not, however, expressly address what law governs the administration of the
trust. As a result of HB 499, R.C. §5801.06 now includes new language addressing what
law governs trust administration. Under it, if the terms of the trust designate the law to
govern trust administration, that law will apply. If not, the law of the trust's principal
place of administration (which is not defined in the OTC or in the Uniform Trust Code
(“UTC”), on which the OTC is based) will govern. Further, if the terms of the trust do not
specify the law to govern trust administration and the trust's principal place of
administration is moved, the law of the new principal place of administration will govern
the administration of the trust from the time of the transfer.
Guardian of person or estate. A number of provisions of the OTC reference a
guardian of the person or estate. For example, under R.C. §5803.03(A) and (B), a
guardian of the person or estate may represent and bind the ward or the estate the
guardian is responsible for (as long as there is not a conflict of interest between the
representative and the person being represented). The OTC, as originally enacted, did not
provide that a guardian must act in accordance with Chapter 2111 of the Revised Code, if
1

the guardian was appointed by an Ohio court, or by other applicable law, if the guardian
was appointed elsewhere. Under HB 499, the OTC now does so in new R.C. §5801.11.
Modification and termination of trusts. R.C. §5804.11(A) provides for the
modification or termination of a noncharitable irrevocable trust by the settlor and all of
the trust’s beneficiaries. As originally enacted, it directed the court to approve a
modification or termination if the court found that the settlor and all of the beneficiaries
consented to it. Under amended R.C. §5804.11(A), the court must also find “that all
consents, including any given by representatives under Chapter 5803. of the Revised
Code, are valid, and that all parties giving consent are competent to do so.” Further, as
originally enacted, R.C. §5804.11(A) applied only to irrevocable trusts created after
2006, or to revocable trusts that became irrevocable after 2006. HB 499 eliminated that
restriction, thus making R.C. §5804.11(A), like most of the rest of the OTC, also
applicable to pre-OTC trusts.
Generally, R.C. §5804.13, as originally enacted, provided that if a particular
charitable purpose of a trust fails, the court may apply cy pres to modify the trust’s terms,
or terminate the trust, in a manner consistent with the settlor’s charitable purposes. The
only exception was that if a trust term addressed that contingency and provided for
distribution to a noncharitable beneficiary, it would prevail over the court’s power to
apply cy pres. Under HB 499, the court also is barred from exercising its cy pres
authority if the terms of the trust provide for alternative charitable purposes or
beneficiaries if a particular charitable purpose fails.
The OTC, as originally enacted, included in R.C. §5804.17 the UTC’s statute on
the combination or division of trusts. Former R.C. §1339.67, which had addressed that
subject somewhat differently, was repealed. Because the standard for combining or
dividing trusts under the UTC’s statute is more restrictive than under former R.C.
§1339.67, HB 499 amended R.C. §5804.17 to restore the standard from former R.C.
§1339.67.
Revocable trusts. Under R.C. §5806.03(A), the trustee’s duties are owed
exclusively to the settlor of a revocable trust while the settlor is living, regardless of
whether the settlor is incapacitated. Generally, R.C. §5808.13 provides that the trustee
must provide information about the trust to current beneficiaries and other beneficiaries
who request it. The OTC, as originally enacted, did not expressly address whether the
trustee’s information and reporting duties under R.C. §5808.13 are owed to beneficiaries
of a revocable trust other than the settlor during the settlor’s lifetime. HB 499 resolved
that uncertainty by inserting language in R.C. §5806.03(A), and adding new division (G)
to R.C. §5808.13, each of which expressly states that during the lifetime of the settlor of a
revocable trust, regardless of whether the settlor has capacity, the trustee’s duties to
inform and report under R.C. §5808.13 are owed exclusively to the settlor.
As originally enacted, R.C. §5806.04 (consistent with prior R.C. §2305.121)
provided for a two-year contest period (from the settlor’s death) for revocable trusts. The
period for contesting a will under R.C. §2107.76 is three months from the filing of the
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certificate with respect to notice having been given for the probate of the will. Because
revocable trusts are used primarily as will substitutes, HB 499 changed the limitations
period for contesting a trust to make it more comparable to, but still not the same as, that
for contesting a will. Under amended R.C. §5806.04, the contest period ends on the first
to occur of two years from the settlor’s death or six months from the date on which the
trustee sends a potential contestant a copy of the trust instrument and a notice informing
the person of the trust's existence, of the trustee's name and address, and of the time
allowed for bringing the contest.
Right of beneficiary to copy of trust instrument. The default rule under R.C.
§5808.13(B)(1), as originally enacted, was that the trustee was required to provide a copy
of the trust instrument to a beneficiary who requested it. HB 499 revised that rule to
allow the trustee to furnish a beneficiary who requests a copy of the trust instrument with
a redacted copy that includes only the provisions that the trustee determines are relevant
to the beneficiary’s interest in the trust. Amended R.C. §5808.13(B)(1) further provides,
however, that if the beneficiary then requests a copy of the entire trust instrument, the
trustee must provide it.
Liability of trustee. R.C. §5810.05 is the OTC’s two year statute of limitations
for actions against a trustee. As originally enacted, it did not address equitable principles
that may affect the limitations period. HB 499 amended the statute of limitations to
explicitly state that an action against a trustee also might be barred by such equitable
principles as laches, unclean hands, estoppel, and waiver.

II.

Ohio Trust Code Cases3

Sowers v. Luginbill.4 Rights of creditors of settlor of revocable trust after
settlor’s death.
Sowers may be the most important of the recent OTC developments as it calls into
question whether assets in a deceased settlor’s revocable trust will be protected from
claims of the settlor’s creditors. The settlor of a revocable trust caused a car accident in
which the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff sued the settlor, who died while the action
was pending. The UTC includes a provision (§505(a)(3)) under which, after the death of
the settlor of a revocable trust, the assets of the trust are subject to the claims of the
settlor’s creditors (if the settlor’s probate estate is insufficient to pay them). At least in
part because that result is contrary to the holding of Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 21
N.E.2d 119 (Ohio 1939), the OTC does not include a similar provision. Nevertheless,
because in Sowers the plaintiff sued the settlor before his death, the court distinguished
Schofield and held that the assets in the trust were subject to the plaintiff’s claim.
According to the court, that result was consistent with the “plain language and legislative
purpose” of another OTC statute, R.C. §5805.06, under which (i) the assets of a
revocable trust are subject to the claims of the settlor’s creditors during the settlor’s
lifetime and (ii) the assets of an irrevocable trust in which the settlor retained an interest
are subject to the claims of the settlor’s creditors.
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Vaughn v. Huntington National Bank.5 The material purpose limitation on the
ability of beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust to terminate it early.6
Grandmother’s 1971 will provided for two $50,000 trusts, one for each of two
granddaughters. The terms of the trusts, which were established when grandmother died a
year later (when the grandchildren were 21 and 19 years of age), provided for each
granddaughter to receive $250 per month for life. At a granddaughter’s death, the $250
monthly payments were to continue for her issue. The will did not include any provisions
for the termination of the trusts. In 2003, after having received the $250 monthly
distributions for more than 30 years, the granddaughters filed motions for the trusts to be
terminated and the trusts’ assets (then approximately $50,000 in each trust) to be
distributed to them. The magistrate’s decision to deny their petitions – because under
R.C. §5804.11(B) the continuance of each trust was necessary to achieve a material
purpose of the trust – was approved by the trial court, and its decision was affirmed by
the court of appeals. Quoting from the comment to the analogous provision of the UTC
(§411(b)), which in turn quoted from the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, §65 cmt. d, the
court noted that the not-necessary-to-achieve-any-material-purpose requirement for
termination under R.C. §5804.11(B) “does not mean that the trust has no remaining
function. In order to be material, the purpose remaining to be performed must be of some
significance: Material purposes are not readily to be inferred…[but] sometimes, of
course, the very nature or design of a trust suggests its protective nature or some other
material purpose.” The court of appeals found that “the design of these trusts illustrates
the material purpose of the trusts, that [the grandchildren] and their issue…receive a
secure monthly income as long as the corpus of the trust remains.” (The opinion does not
address the possibility of the court terminating the testamentary trusts under the
uneconomic trust termination provisions of R.C. §2109.62, presumably because that
statute provides for a proceeding for such a termination to be initiated by a motion filed
by the trustee, and the trustee in this case opposed the early terminations.)
In re Trust of Lowry.7 Modification of terms of charitable trust under cy pres
doctrine.
The decedent’s will created a charitable testamentary trust for the beautification
and upkeep of three cemeteries located in Damascus Township, Henry County, Ohio. In
2005, the trust corpus was approximately $75,000. The trustees, who also served as the
trustees of the township, sought a distribution of the trust corpus in excess of $25,000, on
the ground that $25,000 was sufficient to provide for the maintenance of the cemeteries.
Through exercise of its cy pres power under R.C. §5804.13, the probate court ordered the
distribution and that it be used for capital improvements for the cemeteries or for other
capital improvements in the township. In response to the Attorney General’s appeal, the
appellate court reversed. In doing so it questioned the probate court’s determination that
the administration of the trust had become impracticable, and held that even if that were
the case, R.C. §5804.13 requires that the court’s cy pres authority be exercised in a
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manner consistent with the settlor’s charitable purposes. Here, the probate court’s order
permitting the trust funds to be used for capital improvements in the township was too
dissimilar to the decedent’s intent of benefitting the cemeteries.
In re Trust FBO Frank.8 Private settlement agreement to dispense with the
requirement that the trustee of a testamentary trust give a bond.
The decedent’s will created a testamentary trust and did not dispense with the
requirement that the trustee post a bond. After the OTC became effective, the trustee and
his brother, a beneficiary of the trust, entered into a private settlement agreement (PSA)
under R.C. §5801.10 to modify the will to dispense with the posting of a bond. The
probate court denied approval of the PSA, holding that such an agreement could not
operate to deprive it of jurisdiction to enforce a statutory requirement of Chapter 2109
governing the administration of trusts. The court of appeals reversed, finding (i) that
while the proposed modification of the will would dispense with the bond requirement, it
would do so subject to R.C. §2109.04(A)(2), under which the court nevertheless could
order a bond if “the court is of the opinion that the interest of the trust demands it,” and
(ii) the modification would not deprive the probate court of jurisdiction to enforce the
requirements of Chapter 2109.
Interestingly, the PSA, which was entered into by the trustee and his beneficiary
brother, apparently purported to be between the trustee and the sole beneficiary of the
trust. However, in a footnote, the court of appeals stated: “The will designates [the
brother], his wife and children as trust beneficiaries. [For a PSA,] R.C. §5801.10(B)(2)
requires agreement by all beneficiaries.” After reversing the probate court’s denial of the
motion to approve the PSA, the court of appeals’ opinion further stated: “We offer no
opinion concerning whether the settlement agreement satisfies R.C. §5801.10 or whether,
if the court approves the agreement, it should or should not order a bond in some
amount.”
Cundall v. U.S. Bank.9 Jurisdiction of Ohio court over out-of-state beneficiaries
of Ohio trust; releases. (This discussion focuses on the portions of the court of appeals
opinion in Cundall dealing with the OTC. The Supreme Court, which subsequently held
that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations, did not address the
OTC subjects. )
Beneficiaries of a trust administered in Ohio filed an action against the estate of a
deceased trustee and another trustee for breach of duty. Out-of-state beneficiaries who
were named as parties argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over them. The OTC
includes a provision (R.C. §5802.02(B)) under which beneficiaries of a trust that has its
principal place of administration in Ohio are subject to the jurisdiction of Ohio courts
regarding any matter involving the trust. The court of appeals held that that provision,
which as a part of the OTC was effective January 1, 2007, could be applied retroactively
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(and that jurisdiction was proper under Ohio’s long-arm statute (R.C. §2307.382) and
civil rule (Civil Rule 4.3) even without R.C. §5802.02(B)).
Cundall also involved the effect of releases given by the plaintiff beneficiaries
with respect to the transaction as to which they alleged that the trustees had breached
their duties. In rejecting the trustees’ argument that the case should have been dismissed
because of the releases, the court of appeals noted that the OTC provision on the subject
(R.C. §5810.09) was not applicable, as the transaction in question occurred well before
the OTC’s effective date, but that if it had applied, dismissal would not have been
warranted because R.C. §5810.09 does not protect trustees who obtain releases by
improper conduct, as the plaintiffs alleged.

III.
A.

Issues under or Related to the OTC

Private Settlement Agreements10

The OTC’s private settlement agreement (PSA) statute, R.C. §5801.10, is
intended to facilitate the resolution of disputes and uncertainties outside of the courts.
Under division (B), the required parties to a PSA are the trustees, all beneficiaries,
creditors whose interests would be affected by the PSA, and the settlor (if living and if no
adverse income or transfer tax results would arise from the settlor’s participation).11
Division (E) provides that PSAs that comply with the statute’s requirements are final and
binding.
Under division (C), PSAs may be used “with respect to any matter concerning the
construction of, administration of, or distributions under the terms of the trust, the
investment of income or principal held by the trustee, or other matters.” That broad
authorization, however, is followed by significant limitations:
The agreement may not effect a termination of the trust before the date specified
for the trust's termination in the terms of the trust, change the interests of the
beneficiaries in the trust [with exceptions for certain tax motivated modifications],
or include terms and conditions that could not be properly approved by the court
under [the OTC] or other applicable law. The invalidity of any provision of the
agreement does not affect the validity of other provisions of the agreement.12
Generally, under the Restatement, Second, of Trusts, §§342 and 216, an
agreement between a trustee and beneficiaries to terminate a trust early, or to change the
beneficiaries’ interests in the trust, is valid and the trustee will not be liable to consenting
beneficiaries (assuming their consents were valid13) regardless of whether its conduct in
terminating the trust early or changing beneficiaries’ interests in the trust otherwise
would have constituted a breach of the terms of the trust. Those results were not certain at
common law, however,14 and whether they are available in Ohio after enactment of the
OTC also is unclear.15

6

As quoted above, under division (C) of the PSA statute, a PSA may not be used to
terminate a trust early (or change beneficial interests in the trust). A question raised is
whether a trustee who had the consent of the beneficiaries could be liable for terminating
a trust early (or changing the beneficial interests in the trust), despite the prohibition on
using a PSA to do so.16 In that regard, R.C. §5810.09 provides:
A trustee is not liable to a beneficiary for breach of trust if the beneficiary
consented to the conduct constituting the breach, released the trustee from liability
for the breach, or ratified the transaction constituting the breach, unless the
consent, release, or ratification of the beneficiary was induced by improper
conduct of the trustee or, at the time of the consent, release, or ratification, the
beneficiary did not know of the beneficiary's rights or of the material facts
relating to the breach.
Note that there is no exception for a breach that terminates a trust early, or changes its
beneficial interests. Thus, if a court imposed liability on a trustee for such conduct, it
would be doing so against the plain language of R.C. §5810.09 and, arguably, the
common law.17
If, because of R.C. §5810.09, a trustee would not be liable to consenting
beneficiaries for terminating a trust early, or changing beneficial interests, what, if any,
practical effect does the prohibition on using PSAs to do so have? Under division (G) of
the PSA statute (R.C. §5801.10), any party to a PSA may request that the court approve
it, including making a finding that the representation of any party under Chapter 5803
was adequate18 and that the PSA contains terms and conditions the court could have
properly approved. Because an agreement to terminate a trust early or change its
beneficial interests cannot be a PSA, the parties to such an agreement would not have the
option of having the court determine its validity. More important, under division (E) of
the PSA statute, a valid PSA “shall be final and binding on the trustee, the settlor if
living, all beneficiaries, and their heirs, successors, and assigns.” By contrast, division
(C) refers to “the invalidity of any provision” of a PSA immediately following the
prohibitions on using a PSA to terminate a trust early or change beneficial interests, thus
suggesting that the terms of an agreement between the trustee and beneficiaries to do so
would be “invalid.” Would an “invalid” agreement to terminate a trust early or change its
beneficial interests not be final and binding on the parties to it? For example, would a
consenting beneficiary later be able to, in some form or fashion, “undo” the early
termination or change in beneficial interests? Would such equitable doctrines as estoppel,
waiver, or laches preclude the beneficiary from doing so?
Another aspect of this subject is that “[t]he common law of trusts and principles
of equity continue to apply in this state, except to the extent modified by [the OTC] or
another section of the Revised Code.”19 As noted above, generally, at common law, an
agreement between the trustee and beneficiaries to terminate a trust early (or change
beneficial interests) is valid and the trustee is not liable for complying with the
agreement.20 The yet-to-be-answered question raised is whether, after enactment of the
OTC, a trustee and beneficiaries could by a simple agreement, that was not intended to
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comply with the PSA requirements and limitations or to obtain its benefits, safely
terminate a trust early or change its beneficial interests, or whether any ability they may
have had to do so at common law is foreclosed because the common law rules allowing
such have been preempted by having been modified by the OTC’s PSA statute and its
rather detailed and specific rules in Chapter 5804 on when trusts can be terminated or
modified.21

B.

Creation of Trust by Agent under a Durable Power of Attorney

The OTC does not explicitly address whether an authorized agent under a durable
power of attorney may create a trust for a principal.22 R.C. §5804.01 lists four ways that a
trust may be created: (i) by lifetime or death transfer of property to another as trustee; (ii)
by declaration of the owner of property that the owner holds it as trustee; (iii) by exercise
of a power of appointment in favor of a trustee; and (iv) by court order. There is no
mention of a trust being created by an agent who is authorized to do so under a durable
power of attorney. Further, R.C. §5804.02 sets forth the requirements for the creation of a
trust. Under division (A)(1), the settlor must have capacity, and under division (A)(2), the
settlor must indicate an intention to create a trust. There is no mention of an exception for
an incapacitated settlor who, prior to becoming incapacitated, had authorized an agent to
create a trust on the principal’s behalf.
While an argument can thus be made that an authorized agent may not create a
trust for a principal under the OTC, the Code does not state that an agent may not do so
and R.C. §5804.01 does not state that the methods it lists for creating a trust are the only
ways a trust can be created. (In fact, the comment to the analogous provision of the UTC,
§401, explicitly states that “[t]he methods specified in this section are not exclusive.”)
Further, the statutory form of power of attorney in R.C. §1337.18(A) states: “Unless
expressly authorized in the power of attorney, a power of attorney does not grant
authority to an agent to…create…a trust,” thus clearly implying that if expressly
authorized to do so, an agent can create a trust for the principal. Note also that it would be
inconsistent to allow an authorized agent to amend the terms of a revocable trust, as
clearly can be done under R.C. §5806.02(E), and to otherwise control the disposition of
the principal’s property during the principal’s life or at his or her death by making gifts,
creating or changing rights of survivorship, or designating or changing the designation of
a beneficiary of an insurance policy or retirement plan interest, all of which are implicitly
authorized by R.C. §1337.18(A), but not to allow an authorized agent to create a trust.
Further, there is substantial authority in addition to R.C. §1337.18 that an authorized
agent may create a trust for a principal.23 Thus, while it is not entirely clear under the
OTC that an authorized agent may create a trust for the principal, the stronger argument
is that such an agent may do so.
A committee of the OSBA’s Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Law section,
chaired by Rick Davis, of Canton, is working on a modified version of the Uniform
Power of Attorney Act (UPOAA), which allows authorized agents to create trusts for
principals,24 and is considering this issue. The committee expects to present a proposal to
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adopt the UPOAA, with modifications, and to amend the OTC to expressly allow an
authorized agent to create a trust for the principal, to the section’s Council at its meeting
scheduled for September 11 and 12, 2009 in Columbus.
C.
Consequences of Settlor Being a Permissible Appointee of a Power of
Appointment
Consider an irrevocable inter vivos trust under which the settlor is not a
beneficiary and which gives the settlor’s spouse (or child) a broad non-general lifetime
and testamentary power to appoint the trust assets to anyone other than the power holder,
the power holder’s estate or the creditors of either. With such a power, the power holder
could appoint the trust assets to the settlor. R.C. §5805.06(A)(2) provides that creditors of
a settlor of an irrevocable trust “may reach the maximum amount that can be distributed
to or for the settlor’s benefit.” In the example above, are assets that could be appointed to
the settlor by the holder of the non-general power amounts “that can be distributed to or
for the settlor’s benefit” within the meaning of R.C. §5805.06(A)(2)? If so, because the
settlor’s creditors could reach the trust assets, would they be includible in the settlor’s
gross estate for estate tax purposes?25
While an argument to that effect can be made, it does not appear that that should
be the case. R.C. §5805.06(A)(2), which is identical to UTC §505(a)(2), codifies
“traditional doctrine in providing that a settlor who is also a beneficiary may not use the
trust as a shield against the settlor’s creditors (emphasis added).”26 A settlor whose only
“interest” in an irrevocable trust is as a permissible appointee of an unexercised, nonfiduciary power of appointment held by another is owed no fiduciary duties with respect
to the trust, its assets, or the power of appointment, and should not be treated as a
“beneficiary” of the trust.27 Further, R.C. §5805.06(A)(2) speaks in terms of amounts
“that can be distributed to or for the settlor’s benefit (emphasis added).” Arguably,
amounts the settlor might receive through the exercise of a non-fiduciary power of
appointment should not constitute amounts that can be “distributed” from the trust to or
for the settlor’s benefit, as “distributions” from a trust are generally understood to mean
amounts paid, or other assets conveyed, from the trustee to the beneficiaries under the
terms of the trust.
This issue is being considered by the newly formed Technical Tax Issues under
the Ohio Trust Code Committee of the EPTPL section, which is chaired by Roy Krall, of
Akron.
D.

Non-Trustee with Power over Discretionary Distributions

If a beneficiary of a trust (who is not a settlor of the trust) also is a trustee with the
discretionary power to make distributions to him or herself, the general rule under R.C.
§5808.14(B)(1) is that the trustee-beneficiary may exercise the power only in accordance
with an ascertainable standard relating to health, education, maintenance, or support.28
The purpose of the provision is to protect against the inadvertent creation of a general
power of appointment in the trustee-beneficiary that would cause the trust assets to be
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includible in the beneficiary’s gross estate. Another issue the committee on Technical
Tax Issues under the Ohio Trust Code is considering is whether the statute should be
amended to also apply to situations in which a non-trustee holds a power to make, or
cause to be made, discretionary distributions to him or herself.
E.

Trust Decanting

“Trust decanting” refers to the distribution by a trustee who has discretion to
distribute principal of a trust (the “first trust”) in further trust (the “second trust”) for the
benefit of one or more beneficiaries of the first trust. While a trustee may have the power
to decant under common law, that is not clear in many jurisdictions, including Ohio.
Statutes providing such authority have been enacted in New York, Tennessee, Delaware,
Alaska, South Dakota, Florida and New Hampshire, and Missouri is presently working
on such a statute. A committee of the EPTPL section chaired by Patty Culler, of
Cleveland, is working on a decanting statute for Ohio. The committee presented a draft
statute to the EPTPL section Council at its May 2009 meeting in Cleveland. The Council
approved the statute in principle, but with modifications that the committee will
incorporate into the proposed statute.
F.

Anti-Lapse

Generally, if a devisee under a will predeceases the testator, the gift to the devisee
under the will lapses so that the devise does not pass through the predeceased devisee’s
estate to his or her own intestate heirs or will devisees. If, however, (i) the predeceased
devisee was a relative of the testator, (ii) one or more descendants of the predeceased
devisee survived the testator, and (iii) the testator’s will did not express an intent to the
contrary, the devise will be saved for the predeceased devisee’s descendants by Ohio’s
wills anti-lapse statute (R.C. §2107.52).
In First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Tenney,29 a settlor created a revocable
trust the terms of which provided for the distribution of the trust assets to the settlor’s
sister upon the settlor’s death. The instrument did not require the sister to survive the
settlor in order to take, nor did it otherwise provide for the contingency of the sister
predeceasing the settlor, which occurred. Consistent with the common law of future
interests, the Supreme Court held that the sister’s interest was not contingent on surviving
the settlor. Rather, her remainder was vested, subject to defeasance if the settlor had
exercised her power to revoke the trust, and passed through the sister’s estate to her
residuary devisee. Because when the settlor later died she had not revoked (or amended)
the trust, the sister’s residuary devisee took at the settlor’s death.
By contrast, in Dollar Savings & Trust Company of Youngstown v. Byrne,30 when
a remainder beneficiary of a revocable trust predeceased the settlor, the Supreme Court
did not hold that the predeceased beneficiary’s interest passed through the predeceased
beneficiary’s estate. Instead, the Court applied the wills anti-lapse statute to the gift so
that the predeceased beneficiary’s descendants took upon the settlor’s later death. Dollar
Savings, however, effectively was overruled prospectively by amendments to R.C. §§
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2107.01 and 2107.52, under which it is clear that the wills anti-lapse statute does not
apply to trusts.
A committee of the EPTPL section, chaired by John Clark, of Canton, is studying
the Uniform Probate Code’s trust anti-lapse statute (UPC §2-707) for possible adoption,
with modifications, in Ohio.31 The committee expects to propose a new trust anti-lapse
statute which would, unless the instrument expressed a contrary intention (i) make a
remainder beneficiary’s interest contingent on surviving the date on which the interest
was to take effect in possession or enjoyment (the “distribution date,” which in the
context of an outright gift on the death of a settlor of a revocable trust would be the date
of the settlor’s death) and (ii) provide a substitute anti-lapse gift to the remainder
beneficiary’s descendants, if the remainder beneficiary did not survive the distribution
date and was a grandparent, descendant of a grandparent, or stepchild of the settlor. The
statute, which would apply to irrevocable as well as revocable trusts, would thus change
the result in cases like Tenney and reach the same result in cases like Dollar Savings. In
addition, because the new statute would differ significantly from the present wills antilapse statute (R.C. §2107.52),32 the committee expects to propose that the wills anti-lapse
statute be amended to be consistent with the new trust anti-lapse statute. Finally, the
committee also plans to propose an amendment to the OTC’s distributions statute, R.C.
§5808.17, under which a trustee would be authorized to make distributions directly to the
heirs or devisees of a predeceased beneficiary to whom distributions were owed and for
whom an estate administration proceeding is not pending, rather than requiring an estate
administration proceeding to be opened or reopened.
G.

Trustee’s Duties to Inform and Report to Beneficiaries33

R.C. §5808.13 includes a number of default rules under which a trustee must
provide information to beneficiaries about the trust. These rules depart significantly from
pre-OTC Ohio law.34 Among the more significant of these duties are the following:
1.

The trustee must keep current beneficiaries reasonably informed about the
administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for them to
protect their interests, regardless of whether they have requested
information about the trust. (The trustee also must promptly respond to
any beneficiary’s request for information related to the administration of
the trust, unless the request is unreasonable under the circumstances.)35

2.

If any beneficiary requests a copy of the trust instrument, the trustee must
promptly furnish it. (The trustee may redact the copy to show only the
provisions that relate to the beneficiary’s interest in the trust, but if the
beneficiary requests a copy of the entire instrument, the trustee must
furnish it.)36

3.

Within sixty days of the trustee learning of the creation of an irrevocable
trust or of a revocable trust becoming irrevocable, the trustee must inform
the trust’s current beneficiaries of (i) the trust’s existence; (ii) the identity
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of the settlor, (iii) the right to request a copy of the trust instrument, and
(iv) the right to a trustee’s report.37
4.

At least annually, the trustee must send current beneficiaries, and other
beneficiaries who request it, a report of the trust property, liabilities,
receipts, and disbursements, including the source and amount of the
trustee’s compensation, a listing of the trust assets, and, if feasible, the
trust assets’ respective market values.38

R.C. §5801.04(B) sets forth mandatory rules that the settlor may not override in
the terms of the trust. Two of them are with respect to the trustee’s reporting obligations:
1.

Unless the settlor, in the trust instrument, designates a “surrogate” to
receive the information on behalf of a beneficiary,39 the trustee’s duty to
inform a current beneficiary who has reached age twenty-five of (i) the
existence of the trust, (ii) the identity of the trustee, and (iii) their right to
request trustee's reports, may not be waived.40

2.

Unless the settlor, in the trust instrument, designates a “surrogate” to
receive the information on behalf of a beneficiary, the trustee’s duty to
respond to the request of a current beneficiary for trustee's reports and
other information reasonably related to the administration of a trust may
not be waived.41

These provisions of the Trust Code, which apply to pre-OTC as well as post-OTC
irrevocable trusts, have been the subject of considerable debate and disagreement. The
EPTPL Council established a committee, chaired by Bob Barnett, of Columbus, to
consider changing the OTC’s information and reporting rules. At its January 2009
meeting, the Council considered a proposal from the committee. The key points of the
proposal were (i) to allow the settlor to waive the trustee’s duty to inform current
beneficiaries of the existence of the trust and (ii) to eliminate the default rules that require
the trustee to provide information about the trust to current beneficiaries who have not
requested it. Rather, under the proposal, the trustee would have been required to provide
information about the trust to beneficiaries only in response to their requests. The
proposal was defeated by a vote of 25 to 17 and the committee was disbanded.

Professor Newman served as Reporter for the Ohio Trust Code.
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R.C. §5808.13(C).
The duty of the surrogate, who presumably would be treated as a fiduciary, is to “act in good faith to
protect the interests” of the beneficiary for whom the surrogate is entitled to receive information. The OTC
also accommodates the use of other non-trustee fiduciaries, sometimes referred to as “trust protectors” or
“trust advisors.” See R.C. §5808.08. A recent case from Missouri addressed the potential liability of such
non-trustees. In Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Patrick Davis, P.C., 283 S.W.3d 786 (Mo. App.
S.D. 2009), a special needs trust was created to receive the proceeds from the settlement of a claim arising
from the beneficiary’s injury in a car accident. The attorney who handled the claim was designated “trust
protector” in the trust instrument. Under the terms of the trust, the trust protector had the authority to
remove and replace the trustee, which authority was “conferred in a fiduciary capacity and shall be so
exercised, but the trust protector shall not be liable for any action taken in good faith.” After the original
trustees resigned, the trust protector appointed successor trustees, including the lawyer who had referred the
personal injury case that was the source of the settlement proceeds to the trust protector. It was alleged that
the beneficiary informed the trust protector that the new trustees were inappropriately spending trust funds.
Later, the new trustees and the trust protector resigned. Ultimately, the beneficiary’s mother became trustee
and sued the former trustees and the trust protector for breaches of duty. The lower court granted the trust
protector’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the trust protector had no duty to supervise
the trustees. The appellate court, with two concurring opinions, reversed. It found that there were issues of
material fact with respect to the scope of the trust protector’s duties of care and loyalty and whether there
had been a breach of duty. Noting that there was no Missouri law dealing with trust protectors, the court
quoted from the comment to UTC 808 dealing with powers to direct (for Ohio, see R.C. § 5808.08) that §
808 “ratif[ies] the use of trust protectors and advisers.”
40
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